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by Federico Foders
• For several decades, the countries in Central and Eastern Europe pursued an energy-
intensive strategy of economic development based on distorted relative prices of
energy. This typical feature of central planning created the illusion of a virtually unlim-
ited supply of energy. The illusion came to an end in the 1980s, when the widening gap
between energy supply and energy demand faced by the region led to a severe energy
crisis.
9 Bulgaria is one of the countries most affected by the energy crisis in Central and Eastern
Europe. Poorly endowed with energy resources, Bulgaria relies largely on international
trade to satisfy its demand for energy. During Bulgaria's membership in the CMEA,
energy-intensive growth resulted in a strong dependency on only one energy exporter,
the former Soviet Union. With the CMEA's dissolution, Bulgaria was left to design and
implement a new energy policy as a part of its own efforts to transform its economy into
a market economy.
• In spite of the far-reaching liberalization of prices experienced by Bulgaria in 1991, eco-
nomic transition has been rather slow and energy reform has been neglected. Domestic
energy prices have remained under government control, and energy prices have been
falling in real terms due to the high overall inflation. Domestically produced primary
energy is not priced at international levels, and consumer prices for final energy do not
reflect domestic production costs. Moreover, current energy pricing favours small-
scale users (households) and discriminates against large-scale users (industry). The
continuing high level of energy consumption and the prevailing fuel mix (oil products
and lignite) have a particularly adverse effect on the environment in terms of SO2 and
CO2 emissions.
• In the short run, energy policy should concentrate on the liberalization of domestic
energy prices. Primary energy should be priced at world market prices and final energy
at marginal costs. A realistic valuation of energy products will support the structural
change component of the transformation process and increase energy efficiency in Bul-
garia. A policy of fuel diversification complemented by one of regional diversification of
energy imports will constitute the best long-run hedge against the risk of supply disrup-
tions. Energy utilities should be privatized, and foreign companies should be allowed to
play a leading role in the modernization of the energy sector. The Bulgarian government
should create optimal conditions for cooperating closely with EC member countries in
the field of energy, as already delineated in the European Energy Charter and in Bulgar-
ia's Association Treaty with the EC. As long as sophisticated emission fees can be nei-
ther implemented nor enforced, energy-related environmental pollution should be dealt
with by taxing energy use at the consumer level with a simple uniform ad valorem rate
applied to all fuels.
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I. Introduction
Shortly after they embarked on the transforma-
tion of their centrally planned economies into
market economies, the governments of Central
and Eastern Europe became aware of the close
interdependence between energy sector reforms
and the general transformation process. Central-
ized decision-making on energy supply and al-
location had been the cornerstone of central
planning: abundant and cheap energy had been
assumed to be the second most important in-
gredient of economic growth, capital being the
most important. Government investment in the
energy sector had been given top priority. This
growth policy resulted in an economy with both
high energy and high capital intensities. With
such a legacy of the past, energy sector reform
constitutes a necessary condition in the transi-
tion from a centrally planned to a market econ-
omy.
Decades of cheap energy have led to a series
of domestic and regional distortions. Besides an
energy-intensive industrial structure, domestic
distortions include a lack of investment in en-
ergy-saving technologies, in the development
of alternative (depletable and non-depletable)
fuels and in environmental protection (includ-
ing nuclear safety). On a regional level, the
dependency of the former member countries of
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(CMEA) regarding energy imports from mainly
one source, the former Soviet Union, developed
into a serious threat for sustained energy-
intensive economic growth in those countries.
The mounting gap between regional energy
supply and consumption contributed to the
exhaustion of this resource-wasting model of
growth in the 1980s; the systemic limits to the
supply of conventional fuels could not be
effectively compensated for by turning to the
nuclear option. Since the CMEA member
countries exchanged an important part of their
national product for energy (and other) imports
from the former Soviet Union, the scope for a
regional diversification of energy imports,
which would have called for a diversification of
exports towards hard currency regions, was
generally very small.
Since the dissolution of the CMEA at the
turn of the decade, the burden of adjustment in
the energy sector has had to be borne primarily
by the energy-poor, former CMEA member
countries rather than by the Russian Federation
and some other energy-rich newly independent
states (NIS). Not surprisingly, energy sector re-form has been put high on the economic policy
agenda for the 1990s in the energy-importing
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. How-
ever, since the degree of distortion, the fuel
mix, the economic structure and the status of
the transformation process differ substantially
across countries, the exact design and sequenc-
ing of the policy and instruments needed in a
thorough energy reform should be tailored to
the very specific conditions prevailing in each
country. This study sets out to analyse the Bul-
garian case, in an attempt to derive sound pol-
icy proposals for a country severely hit by the
rearrangement of regional energy trade by the
former Soviet Union.
A word on the quality and availability of
Bulgarian economic statistics should be in or-
der here. Whereas official Bulgarian statistics
for the 1970s and 1980s are generally unreli-
able, recent statistics are, in part, not available,
following the reorganization of the Central Sta-
tistical Office. In this study we therefore draw
heavily on such sources as unpublished reports
prepared by the World Bank, PlanEcon's re-
ports on Developments in the Economies of the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the United
States Central Intelligence Agency's Handbook
of Economic Statistics and the OECD's Centre
for Co-Operation with European Economies in
Transition data bank of Short-Term Economic
Indicators, Central and Eastern Europe, as far
as general statistics are concerned. In those
cases in which estimates from alternative
sources differ we offer our own estimates. In
contrast to general economic statistics, energy
sector statistics from Bulgarian sources, in par-
ticular from the Bulgarian Committee of En-
ergy, seem to reflect actual developments in the
energy field; remaining gaps were filled in this
report resorting to PlanEcon's Energy Report, a
recent unpublished sector study by the World
Bank and other (published) material.
II. Economic Background and Outlook
1. Growth Performance
According to standard economic indicators,
Bulgaria is currently experiencing a deep re-
cession. Industrial production fell by about 24
per cent between December 1990 and Decem-
ber 1991 and by about 40 per cent between De-
cember 1990 and December 1992 [OECD,
CCEET, 1993]. On average, consumer prices
increased by some 5 per cent per month (which
corresponds to an annualized rate of 80 per
cent) during the period January-December
1992; at the end of December 1992, almost
580,000 persons were unemployed (14.8 per
cent of the labour force) [PlanEcon, a, 1993].
After having already contracted in 1990 and
1991, Bulgaria's real gross domestic product
(GDP) faced another dramatic drop due to
recession-cum-inflation in 1992 (Table 1). Fol-
lowing the World Bank's classification, Bul-
garia belongs to the group of countries with a
lower-middle income, specifically to the sub-
group with a per capita income estimate for
1990 in the range of US$2,060 (Algeria) and
US$2,370 (Argentina); the estimate for Bul-
garia is US$2,250, which is higher than Po-
land's (US$1,690) and Romania's (US$1,640)
and which amounts to no more than 10 per cent
of the per capita income of the United States at
current exchange rates [World Bank, b, 1992].
The deterioration of Bulgaria's economic
performance is not a recent phenomenon. Dur-
ing the 44 years of communist rule (1946-
1989), this formerly agricultural country
showed a fast pace of industrialization and
achieved average rates of annual growth of real
GDP of almost 6 per cent per year in the 1950s
and 1960s. Thereafter, however, growth slowed
down to half this rate in the 1970s and to less
than 1 per cent per year in the 1980s (Table 1).
Thus, the current recession cannot be blamed
on either the domestic transformation process
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Since economic growth was driven primarily
by an expansion of industry, particularly of
heavy industry, there are two plausible hy-
potheses explaining Bulgaria's adverse devel-
opment after 1970. First, import substitution in
Bulgaria had already reached its limits in the
late 1960s. Second, neither the existing division
of labour within the CMEA nor the rate and
quality of technological progress achieved in
the Soviet Union (the region's technological
leader) offered new possibilities for industrial
growth in Bulgaria. As a small, resource-poor
country with a population of 8.99 million,
1
exports constituted a necessary outlet for Bul-
garia's industry. Export expansion, however,
was constrained for two reasons: on the one
hand, the absorption capacity of CMEA mem-
ber countries for Bulgarian exports had dimin-
ished, because Bulgaria had begun to run an
increasing trade surplus with CMEA member
countries in the 1980s; on the other hand, an
increasing deficit with Western countries indi-
cated that Bulgarian products were loosing
competitiveness in the West. All in all, external
limits to a further expansion of domestic indus-
trial production along traditional lines seem to
have contributed to the slowdown in economic
growth. For systemic reasons, this development
could not have been halted and reversed by
policies encouraging domestic structural change
and pointing towards a way out of the Soviet
technology trap. The disintegration of the
CMEA has only worsened the situation.
A glance at the growth performance of Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries (Table 1)
shows that in recent decades Bulgaria experi-
enced rates that were not only much lower than
its own historical record, but also lower than
the rates achieved by other countries in the
region. Having led regional economic growth in
the 1960s, Bulgaria suffered the severest slow-
down in the region thereafter, and it suffered a
contraction of real GDP in the early 1990s that
was second only to the contraction in Romania.
2. The Structure of the Bulgarian
Economy
Before World War II, agriculture was Bul-
garia's main economic activity, providing al-
most 65 per cent of total output (Table 2). The
country's comparative advantage was founded
on its continental climate and fertile soil. Indus-
try provided only 15 per cent of the total out-
put. The importance of both sectors almost re-
versed between 1939 and 1991. Interestingly,
agriculture reached its lowest share in 1989 and
started to recover immediately after the trans-
formation process was initiated. The share of
industry increased continuously until 1987 and
declined thereafter. Thus, Bulgaria's economic
structure resembles quite well the pattern ob-
served in other former CMEA member coun-
tries, in which a disproportionately big indus-
trial sector dominates the economy. Bulgaria's
industrial sector also seems to be oversized
compared to other lower-middle-income coun-
tries, such as Algeria, Malaysia and Argentina,
which, like Bulgaria, pursued an culture indus-
trialization strategy based on a forced realloca-









































































Source: Economist Intelligence Unit [a; b, 1992, 1993]; own estimates.
ture towards industry. Bulgaria's services sector
appears to be much smaller than the one typical
for a lower-middle-income market economy.
Bulgaria's industry structure is heavily bi-
ased towards basic, material-intensive indus-
tries, as chemicals and petrochemicals, metal-
lurgy, machine building and electrical engineer-
ing (Table Al), another systemic heritage. This
notwithstanding, food processing still accounts
for a quarter of total industrial output, which is
much more than in any other former CMEA
member country. In this respect, Bulgaria's
economy is very similar to other lower-middle-
income countries. Another systemic feature in-
fluencing the structure of manufacturing is the
relatively low production of durable consumer
goods and of capital goods for the production
of durable consumer goods in this country.
Imbalances in the economic structure also
exist in the geographical pattern of production.
Industrial plants are generally concentrated in
urban areas, where the centralized administra-
tion of economic activity took place. Migration
from the countryside to the cities in the wake of
the already mentioned discrimination against
agriculture was a necessary component of Bul-
garia's model of industrial development. Ex-
cessive geographic concentration of material-
intensive production led to negative externali-
ties in terms of environmental damage and to a
wasteful use of the country's very limited water
resources.
3. The Pattern of Foreign Trade
Foreign trade plays a key role in the Bulgarian
economy. Current estimates put exports plus
imports as a share of Bulgaria's GDP at 96 per
cent (1990) and 35 per cent (1991) (Table 3),
with the lower figure already implying a rela-
tively high degree of openness. Other lower-
middle-income countries as, for example, Al-
geria and Argentina present shares of 50 and 22
per cent, respectively [World Bank, b, 1992].
Although data from different sources differ, the
general impression is that total Bulgarian trade
and particularly ruble-denominated transactions
dropped sharply in 1991 (Table 3), as a conse-
quence of the disintegration of the CMEA.
However, the reduction in trade value seems to
be related not only to a decrease in the physical
volume of trade, but also to such factors as (i)
the valuation of ruble trade in US dollars, (ii)
the depreciation of the Bulgarian currency vis-
a-vis the US dollar between January 1990 (leva
2.02/US$) and December 1991 (leva 17.51/
US$) and (iii) the development of cross rates
(leva-ruble-dollar) during this period. More-
over, it is possible that price changes for
tradables in the ruble area had an impact. Al-
though, at this point, it is neither possible to
clearly identify the nature of all the relevant
factors nor to determine the actual weight of
individual factors, the combined effect of these

































































aAssumptions: GDP for 1990 estimated at USS19.800 million [World Bank, c] and for 1991


















Source: PlanEcon [c, 1992]; World Bank [c]; own estimates and calculations.
ily seen from Table 3: as measured by balance-
of-payments statistics, exports fell by 48 per
cent and imports by 62 per cent; customs sta-
tistics indicate still higher decreases.
In contrast to total and to intra-CMEA trade,
Bulgarian exports to and imports from the West
decreased by only 9 and 25 per cent, respec-
tively (payments statistics), a development that
almost doubled the share of trade (exports plus
imports) with the West in total Bulgarian for-
eign trade. Nevertheless, the former CMEA
member countries remained the largest destina-
tion and origin of Bulgarian trade flows in
1991, with the former Soviet Union remaining
the largest single trade partner (Table A2).
While the relative shares of both exports to and
imports from EFTA member countries and the
United States also increased, the share of trade
with EC member countries increased most,
particularly the shares of trade with Italy,
Greece and the United Kingdom; Germany
remained Bulgaria's single largest partner in the
EC. The relative share of trade with less devel-
oped countries (LDCs) also benefited from the
breakdown of intra-CMEA trade.
The shifts in the regional structure of Bulgar-
ian's foreign trade that ocurred in 1990 and
1991 were related to shifts in the commodity
structure of this country's foreign trade. Ma-
chinery and equipment, once the dominating
product group in both total exports and imports,
were displaced by resource-based product
groups, as chemicals and fertilizers, food raw
materials, processed foodstuffs and industrial
consumer goods
2 (Table A3). Fuels, minerals
and metals, which amounted to "only" about 34
per cent of total imports in 1990, accounted for
about 59 per cent of total imports in 1991,
largely as a result of fuels being valued at inter-
national prices.
Recent developments in the direction and
composition of Bulgarian foreign trade were
accompanied by a radical change in trade pol-
icy. Whilst in the past this country relied on
state trading through a few government-owned
trade firms and substantial quantitative restric-tions, most trade barriers were abolished in
February 1991. Import licences are now granted
automatically virtually for all goods (except
weapons and a few other defence-related
goods), and export restrictions are retained only
for a small number of items. Export taxes and
import duties have been eliminated. Trade
rights have been extended to all firms, private
and non-private, and all importers enjoy unlim-
ited access to foreign exchange in the wake of
introducing current account convertibility of the
domestic currency. Exporters are required to re-
patriate their proceedings within a month; they
are allowed to keep foreign currency-denomi-
nated accounts in Bulgaria.
The relative share of Bulgarian trade with the
OECD member countries and LDCs seems to
have benefited from the collapse of the CMEA.
However, Bulgaria has been running a mount-
ing deficit in its convertible-currency current
account, and, therefore, Bulgaria's ability to
create and expand trade with the West will be
limited by its ability to cope with the payments
problems associated with its foreign debt. Pri-
vate capital inflows are still negligible, and for-
eign exchange earnings continued to drop in
spite of substantial hard-currency income from
tourism in the wake of the Yugoslav crisis. At
the end of 1991, Bulgaria's total debt accounted
for around 152 per cent of GNP and 238 per
cent of the country's convertible-currency ex-
ports (Table A4), putting Bulgaria in a weaker
position in this respect than other highly in-
debted countries (e.g. Poland, Hungary and
Algeria). The size of the debt is related to the
fact that Bulgaria financed its growing deficit in
the convertible-currency current account in the
1980s (especially after the mid-1980s) primar-
ily with credits with short maturities from
Western commercial banks and is now facing
an extraordinary debt service burden. Although
the Bulgarian government suspended payments
of principal in March and debt service in June
1990, ongoing negotiations with the London
Club of commercial bank creditors could help
to restore Bulgaria's access to the international
capital markets soon.
3 In September 1992, Bul-
garia resumed interest payments, and, some
weeks later, the Parliament ratified the debt-
rescheduling agreements negotiated with six of
the 14 Paris Club creditor governments. How-
ever, the future of debt negotiations will depend
on the developments of the relations between
the Bulgarian government and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), which are particularly
influenced by the government's acceptance of
economic targets requested by the IMF. Since
the bulk of Bulgaria's foreign debt is owed to
commercial banks, debt relief schemes to re-
duce the foreign debt following the Brady Plan
for Latin America will be unlikely to be viable
for Bulgaria.
4. Economic Policy
Bulgaria experienced its Big Bang in early
1991, when prices for all goods excluding basic
food products and energy were liberalized. En-
ergy prices were raised twice during 1991, al-
beit without entirely closing the gap between
domestic prices on the one hand and domestic
production costs and world market prices on the
other hand. The prices for coal, district heating
and electricity for households have remained
heavily subsidized. The prices for 7 out of the
14 goods classified as essential and formerly
administered by the government were liberal-
ized in May 1992.
The Big Bang brought about a shift in the
consumer price index as well as real wage
losses during 1991; the central bank largely ac-
commodated the price increase by expanding
the money supply. The real interest rate was
negative
4 and the supply of money (as meas-
ured by Ml) continued to expand in a climate
of general recession. The immediate effects
were an improvement of the real wage (in spite
of further price increases of controlled prod-
ucts) and higher government spending, with the
latter paving the way for higher rates of infla-
tion. The tendency towards higher inflation
rates is revealed by the rate of change of the
real narrow money measure, which fell drasti-
cally during the Big Bang and was generallyunstable in 1991 and 1992 [PlanEcon, c, Octo-
ber 1993].
The system of multiple exchange rates was
substituted by a unified rate, floating vis-a-vis
all other currencies, and partial internal con-
vertibility. Given that the real exchange rate
appreciated almost every month from March
1991 to December 1992, contributing to an
overvaluation of the domestic currency [ibid.],
the floating can be assumed to have been of the
managed type, aiming at keeping the import
bill and foreign debt service payments in do-
mestic currency as low as possible. A reduction
of the budget deficit (1990: 9.2 per cent of
GDP) was originally planned for the end of
1991. Unfortunately, fiscal revenues were much
lower than expected because of the serious de-
cline in economic activity experienced in 1990
and 1991, so that the deficit remained at some 7
per cent, albeit improving somewhat towards
the end of the year [World Bank, c]; interest
payments accounted for about a third of gov-
ernment expenditures in 1991.
5
The government progressed in transforming
the Bulgarian economy into a market economy.
As part of a financial reform, it created the in-
stitutional requirements for a two-tiered bank-
ing system and legally separated the central
bank from the government. Restitution and pri-
vatization legislation has been finally adopted
(Bulgaria is the last of the Eastern European
countries to privatize), and the government has
already set up an agency similar to the German
Treuhandanstalt to administer privatization pro-
jects. In many aspects, the Bulgarian privatiza-
tion law resembles the laws passed in Hungary
and Poland, which is to say that the voucher or
mass privatization option has been definitively
rejected. The new constitution endorses private
property, and the new company law offers a
wide array of organizational possibilities for
private economic activities. Other important
laws (concerning e.g. taxation, securities, bank-
ruptcy and intellectual property) are currently
being prepared. However, the state is still run-
ning about 90 per cent of the economy, al-
though the World Bank reports that more than
170,000 new firms were registered in 1991 and
that the government is rapidly removing most
of the remaining formal constraints on the
establishment of new private firms [ibid.].
Small scale privatization began in 1991 and
affected some 70 shops and petrol stations.
Moreover, restitution of agricultural land was
launched during this year. In 1992, a new drive
in privatization and restitution in urban areas
was introduced and a new general law and
amendments to older laws were passed. The
new law governs not only small but also large
scale privatization, concerning the auctioning of
enterprises with a book value of leva 10 to 200
million (about US$0.5 to 10 million) by the
privatization agency. Therefore, in a first step,
chartered accountants have to value all enter-
prises; employees may buy up to 20 per cent of
non-voting shares at a discount. The agency is
responsible for the privatization of 8,000 major
firms, whereas ministries privatize small and
middle-sized firms directly. The Ministry of
Industry intends to offer between 80 and 100
enterprises for sale, which have been grouped
in three classes according to their readiness for
privatization.
6 The agency aims mainly at at-
tracting foreign buyers, but subsidized credit
shall be available for potential domestic buyers.
Several problems, however, remain un-
solved. Old enterprise debt (government debt
and interfirm debt) still needs to be dealt with.
The planned privatization scheme seems to be
geared toward foreign capital; there is still no
local capital market to mobilize domestic sav-
ings on any important scale. Also, since major
firms are being transformed into public stock
companies, a stock market in which the actual
economic value of these firms can be deter-
mined is still absent. In the end, the general
investment climate as well as the availability of
attractive debt-equity swap schemes will deter-
mine the level and pace of foreign involvement.
Hitherto at least, foreign direct investment in
Bulgaria has been rather negligible.
Demonopolization is also under way in the
context of economic restructuring. Large indus-
trial conglomerates as well as large construc-
tion, transport, tourism and trade firms were
broken up into smaller independent units.10
These smaller units were then transformed into
joint stock and limited liability companies; the
government retains share ownership until pri-
vatization takes place. The same procedure is
applied in agro-industry. In some of the cases
in which demonopolization was impossible and
the affected firms could not be liquidated the
soft budget constraint was continued, in other
cases, however, state subsidies, government
credit and the wage bills were put under tight
control. Enterprise debt, firm asset valuation
and the liquidation of unprofitable firms are is-
sues still to be addressed more seriously in the
current phase of the transformation process, as
well as alternative privatization schemes and
the establishment of a local capital market in
order to mobilize domestic savings [OECD,
CCEET, 1992].
5. Outlook
Three major elements are very likely to deter-
mine Bulgaria's economic future: (i) the speed
of the transformation process and the quality of
its results, (ii) Bulgaria's international position
and (iii) the international environment. The pre-
sent status of the transformation process has al-
ready been analysed in Section II .4; this section
focuses on (ii) and (iii).
Bulgaria's international position can be es-
tablished with respect to this country's relative
growth (or catching-up) potential and with re-
spect to this country's international competi-
tiveness in hard-currency trade. Vis-a-vis the
United States, the technological leader of the
West, the catching-up potential of Bulgaria
seems to be similar to the one of other Eastern
European countries and other lower-middle-in-
come countries. Comparing GDPs across coun-
tries, however, in 1990 Bulgaria's per capita
income exceeded Hungary's, Poland's, Roma-
nia's, Algeria's and Argentina's per capita
income (Table 4). Hence, according to the
catching-up hypothesis,
7 the speed with which
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Algeria and Ar-
gentina converge to the income level of the
United States could be higher than for Bulgaria.
Table 4 — Catching-up Potential of Central and Eastern


























aMeasured as a country's real GDP per capita as a per-
centage of the real GDP per capita of the United States
(=100). International comparability of real GDP has
been achieved using purchasing power parities in 1985
prices. The figures presented here were corrected
downwards (25 per cent) in order to account for the
current unreliability of Central and Eastern European
statistics. — "Own estimates. —
 cUnweighted aver-
ages. The average for the lower-middle-income coun-
tries includes Bulgaria.
Source: World Bank [b, 1992]; own calculations.
The international specialization of Bulgaria
can be inferred from the indicator of revealed
comparative advantage (RCA), as shown in
Table 5. This indicator shows whether a coun-
try is competitive (RCA positive) or not (RCA
negative) in international trade with respect to a
specific product group. Bulgaria was competi-
tive in its trade with OECD member countries
in raw-material-intensive products (in 1970,
1980 and 1988), in labour-intensive products
and in capital-intensive products (in 1988). Vis-
a-vis OECD member countries, Bulgaria's
comparative disadvantage showed up in R&D-
intensive products. This can be interpreted as a
result of the heavy systemic distortions in the
Bulgarian economy from 1946 to 1988. Ac-
cording to the factor proportions hypothesis of
international trade, the relatively abundant fac-
tors determined Bulgaria's international posi-
tion; this abundance, however, was not the
result of the market but artificial. Since abun-
dance and scarcity are economic concepts and
depend on the correct valuation of physicalTable 5 -
11
RCA
a of Bulgaria and Asian NICs in Foreign Trade with OECD Member Countries by Product Groups, 1970,







































aRevealed comparative advantage; calculated with OECD foreign trade statistics using the formula:
with x{, m[: exports
4, 56. —
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58, 59, 75, 76. —
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(imports) of product
6 (excl. 62, 67, 68),










group i andX, M: total exports (imports). —
 bSITC 0,2 (excl. 26), 3 (excl. 35),
8 (excl. 87, 88). —
 dSITC 1, 35, 53, 55, 62, 67, 68, 78. —
76, 78), 87, 88. — SHong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Soutl
•
 eSITC 51, 52, 54,
I Korea, Taiwan.
Source: Heitger et al. [1992, Table 21, p. 51].
quantities, the transformation process can be
expected to radically change the measured
abundance and scarcity of production factors by
changing their value. Changes in the relative
factor supplies are likely to result in a new
international position. Bulgaria's future posi-
tion could be influenced by the fact that at
international prices a resource-intensive struc-
ture of production might not be viable anymore.
To the extent that the current international
position of the newly industrializing countries
(NICs) of South-East Asia constitute a predic-
tion of the future profile of comparative advan-
tage of Eastern European countries, it can be
hypothesized that the comparative advantage of
a transformed Eastern Europe shifts away from
resource-intensive products towards labour-
intensive products and easy to imitate R&D-
intensive products (Table 5).
The third factor potentially influencing the
future role of Bulgaria in the world economy is
the expected development of the international
environment. Table 6 presents a summary of
forecasts for GDP growth, world export growth
and the price of oil and capital. A slightly in-
creasing real interest rate could imply that Bul-
garia's external debt problem could become a
serious burden if it remained unsolved [OECD,



































Source: World Bank [b, 1991].12
CCEET, 1992]. It could also imply that foreign
direct investment is bound to be scarce in Bul-
garia during the 1990s and that only the most
attractive locations in the world will see capital
inflows. Bulgaria will have to become com-
petitive as a location of economic activity, in
order to create the necessary conditions for fu-
ture structural change and growth on the basis
of Western technology.
Relatively low oil prices are good news to a
country like Bulgaria, which has an important
oil import bill and negligible own oil reserves.
The same holds with regard to the growth rates
of real income in OECD member countries of
around 3 per cent. Expanding income will
stimulate OECD imports and thus exports from
non-OECD countries. A transformed and inter-
nationally competitive Bulgaria could benefit
from OECD growth by attracting foreign direct
investment from OECD member countries and
exporting labour-intensive and easy to imitate
R&D-intensive products to the OECD region.
After experiencing a contraction of real GDP
of 12 per cent in 1991 and of 7.7 per cent in
1992 (Table 1), the Bulgarian economy will re-
cover only slowly during the first half of the
1990s; higher growth rates should be unlikely
before 1995. The foreign exchange constraint,
exaggerated by the consequences of the foreign
debt, could keep imports on a relatively low
level until 1995. Since growth will need to be
fuelled by new investment, which is dependent
on the country's capacity to import new ma-
chines and equipment from the West, conser-
vative forecasts reasonably see growth of 2 to 3
per cent per year taking place towards the
second half of the 1990s (Table 7).





























III. Energy Supply and Demand
8
1. Resource Endowment and Domes-
tic Production of Primary Energy
Bulgaria has only very few valuable domestic
energy resources. Proven oil and gas reserves,
which were never important, have been declin-
ing, and the country's hydropower potential is
very limited; existing uranium resources are of
low grade. Coal, the only abundant resource, is
of low quality. Accordingly, coal accounted in
1991 for 53 per cent of the domestic production
of primary energy; it is followed by nuclear
power and hydropower (46 per cent) (Table
A14).
Lignite reserves (2,350 million tonnes were
considered to be minable at current domestic
prices and technology in 1990) are concentrated
in one site, the open-pit deposit of Maritza-
East. Supposing the present production rate
were maintained, these reserves could last for
about 85 years. Sub-bituminous (210 million
tonnes), bituminous (10 million tonnes) and
anthracite (1 million tonnes) coal reserves are
not only small but also probably not economi-
cally recoverable. Also, a recent discovery of
hard coal in Northeast Bulgaria, lying at an
average depth of around 2,000 m, might not be
commercially recoverable. Furthermore, where-
as lignite has an extremely low heating value
(about 2.7 times lower than anthracite) and a
high ash and sulphur content, sub-bituminous
coal has a high ash content.
The production of all coal types has declined
in recent years, with the production of anthra-
cite declining most (Table A5). Some of the
factors blamed for this development are: (i)
lower investment in coal mining, (ii) complex
geological structures difficult to be mastered13
applying obsolete technology, (iii) problems in
the provision of spare parts and new mining
equipment by the former Soviet Union and (iv)
the slowdown in economic growth in the
1980s, followed by the current deep recession.
Although proven high-quality hydrocarbon
reserves are estimated at only 13 million barrels
of low-sulphur oil and 5 billion m
3 of natural
gas without sulphur and sulphur compounds
[Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 1991], the
geological prospects for finding onshore and
especially offshore hydrocarbons are considered
to be among the best in Eastern Europe. Large-
scale onshore surveys were begun as early as
1947 and offshore geophysical studies have
been carried out since 1960. The probability
that up-to-date technology, particularly com-
puter-based seismic interpretation, could reveal
the existence of commercially interesting oil
and gas resources is very high, due to the use of
obsolete (mainly Soviet) technology in the past
and to the fact that many parts of the country,
including some areas of the continental shelf in
the Black Sea, have been explored only
slightly. Another 500 to 1,500 million barrels
of oil in reservoirs of 100 to 300 million barrels
each may exist [ibid.]. Production of oil and
gas has been falling for a decade as a conse-
quence of the lack of new reservoir discoveries
(despite considerable government investment in
exploration), the deterioration of infrastructure
and operational equipment and the adverse de-
velopment of the Bulgarian economy in the
1980s (Table A6).
There are no reliable estimates of total Bul-
garian uranium resources. It is known, how-
ever, that the uranium produced in 6 mines and
in 11 in situ leaching facilities is of low grade.
The "yellow cake" (uranium concentrate) used
to be exported to the Soviet Union for upgrad-
ing (and then re-imported by Bulgaria). Cumu-
lated uranium production (1961-1989) reached
about 9,570 tonnes of metal content, i.e. 330
tonnes of metal per year, on average. Produc-
tion fell to 270 tonnes in 1990 and was finally
stopped 1991, because the Soviet Union sus-
pended its purchases. According to the World
Bank, Bulgarian "yellow cake" production is
not profitable at current world market prices
[World Bank, a].
2. Domestic Production of Electricity
and Oil Derivates
There are three sources of electricity in Bul-
garia: (i) domestic plants owned and operated
by the Committee of Energy (1990: about 84
per cent of total supply), (ii) domestic plants
linked to industrial conglomerates (8 per cent)
and (iii) net imports from the former Soviet
Union (8 per cent). Total generating capacity
owned by the Committee of Energy was 10,896
MW in 1990, consisting of 5,161 MW from
fossil fuel (coal, heavy fuel oil, gas) fired
plants, 3,760 MW from the Kozloduy nuclear
plant and 1,975 MW from hydropower plants
(Table A7). Together with the capacity of
industrial companies (1,100 MW) and further
(domestic) capacity dedicated under contract to
the former Soviet Union, Bulgaria's total in-
stalled capacity for the production of electricity
amounts to about 12,000 MW. With the peak
level of demand having reached 8,332 MW in
1989, available capacity should normally be
more than sufficient to meet domestic demand,
at least in nominal terms. For several reasons,
however, available capacity is much lower than
installed capacity.
Almost 38 per cent of electricity produced in
1990 by the Committee of Energy was gener-
ated at Kozloduy, 35 per cent in thermal power
plants burning Bulgarian coal, 18 per cent in
plants using imported coal, 4 per cent from
plants burning heavy fuel oil and gas, and 5 per
cent in hydropower plants. Two of the six reac-
tors (pressurized water reactors made in the
Soviet Union, using slightly enriched uranium
as fuel) installed at Kozloduy are currently
being overhauled, following the emergency im-
provement programme implemented after the
International Atomic Energy Agency had raised
serious objections concerning their operational
safety. The programme, which is being coordi-
nated, administered and financed by the Com-
mission of the EC, does not yet allow predic-14
lions about whether two other units (including
the newest one) will ever be able to operate at
full capacity. Another issue that could keep
Kozloduy from operating near its maximum
level is the still unsolved radioactive waste
treatment and storage problem. Formerly, the
Soviet Union had committed itself to take back
the used fuel volume resulting from burning
upgraded uranium supplied by Soviet sources.
This practice was discontinued in 1990. Plans
to expand nuclear generation capacity by con-
structing a second plant at Belene have been
shelved for the time being.
Many thermal plants, which have utilization
rates averaging only 50 per cent (optimal rates
amount to more than 80 per cent), not only
have operational problems (boilers needing re-
pairs or replacement) but also interruptions in
the deliveries of both domestic and imported
fuels. As was already mentioned above, do-
mestic coal production has been declining for a
number of years. For example, the Maritza-East
complex, which receives lignite deliveries from
a captive mine, has had to adjust electricity
output to coal deliveries, more often than not
falling short of the quantity required for full ca-
pacity operation. Another example is the power
plant at Varna. The utilization rate of this plant,
designed to burn coal from the Ukraine or gas,
has been fluctuating due to uncertain coal
shipments from the Ukraine.
Out of the 87 hydropower plants located in
Bulgaria, making up about 15 per cent of the
country's nominal capacity to generate electric-
ity, 11 plants account for more than 75 per cent
of total hydropower capacity (Table A8). De-
pending largely on the supply of water in the
reservoirs and on differences in altitude occur-
ring in the normal path of rivers, Bulgaria's hy-
dropower potential is limited. Since Bulgaria is
generally endowed with small rivers, the water
load of which is very often affected by
droughts, and the only important river, the
Danube, has a rather small drop in altitude.
Thus, for example, in the event of a dry year (as
in 1990), a partial depletion of the water reser-
voirs used by the main 11 plants can substan-
tially diminish the available hydropower ca-
pacity. In view of the dam recently constructed
in Czechoslovakia that involved a deviation of
the Danube, the water flow through Bulgarian
territory should have diminished, thereby in-
creasing the risk of water supply interruptions.
Furthermore, given competing uses of Bulga-
ria's limited water resources, the current ab-
sence of an efficient water management policy
could also lead to a reduced water availability
for hydropower purposes.
Total Bulgarian electricity output began to
rise steeply in the 1970s after the first reactors
had been activated at Kozloduy. While nuclear
expansion continued throughout the 1980s, the
contribution of hydropower to total output de-
creased because of lower than normal precipita-
tion in this period. Therefore, total supply could
not rise as fast in the 1980s as it did in the
1970s; fluctuations in electricity generation by
thermal plants did not alter the corresponding
output share very much. Total production of
electricity reached its maximum in 1988
(45,036 million kWh) and declined by 2, 5 and
8 per cent, respectively, from 1988 to 1991; our
estimate for 1992 indicates a further decrease
(Table A9), reflecting the fact that power cuts
were frequent during the winter 1991/92.
Oil products are produced in refineries lo-
cated at Burgas (Black Sea coast), Ruse (near
the Danube river) and Pleven (near the biggest
proven onshore oil field). Burgas represents
about 85 per cent of total domestic refining ca-
pacity, which includes facilities for atmospheric
(12 million t/year) and vacuum distillation (3.7
million t/year) and for other purposes, such as
catalytic reforming, hydro treating, catalytic
cracking, alkylation, viscosity breaking and
MTBE production. Until 1991, it satisfied most
of internal oil product demand. In addition, an
increasing share of its capacity has been reserv-
ing for third-party processing. Crude through-
put at Burgas declined from some 12 million
tonnes in 1988 to around 6 to 8 million tonnes
in 1991, because Soviet deliveries were reduced
and the country was unable to diversify imports
in the presence of the foreign debt problem and
the foreign exchange constraint. Whereas third-
party processing also fell in 1990 (by some 4015
per cent), some reports see a substantial expan-
sion in this segment beginning in 1991 [Petro-
leum Intelligence Weekly, 1991]. Hard-cur-
rency fees earned in third-party processing are
expected to widen the scope for both crude oil
imports from new sources and local sales of a
certain share of the refinery output. One of the
remaining two small refineries has specialized
in lubricants (Pleven), and the other one (Ruse)
has been closed down.
Whereas total Bulgarian refinery output be-
gan to decrease in 1990, the most important oil
products rather showed production fluctuations
already in the second half of the 1980s (Table
A10). However, 1990 and 1991 represented a
serious turning point for both total and individ-
ual output, with decreases of 38 and 54 per cent
(total output), 34 and 51 per cent (motor and
aviation petrol), 41 and 52 per cent (gas-diesel
oil) and 38 and 58 per cent (fuel oil). In part,
this development is related to lower demand in
the wake of the general contraction of economic
activity, but mostly to the already mentioned
reduced deliveries of crude oil.
3. Transmission of Energy
Electricity, heat, natural gas and refined oil
products are generally transported either
through grids or by pipeline in Bulgaria; there
is no crude oil pipeline. The first 110 kV elec-
tricity line (with a length of 1985 km) was es-
tablished in 1959. By 1970, a 220 kV line had
also been established, and the domestic electric-
ity grid was carrying power to most parts of the
country. In the 1970s and 1980s, a 400 kV line
was added to the system, including the possi-
bility to convert 400 into 110 kV; currently,
there is a total number of 24 converters of the
400/110 kV type. Following the installation of
low and middle voltage lines (10-20 kV), 279
converters of the 110/20 type were built. In
addition, a 750 kV line was constructed in or-
der to establish a link with the former Soviet
Union, particularly with the Ukraine. As can be
seen from Table 8, Bulgaria's national electri-
city network is quite developed.
Bulgaria's electricity grid is connected with
all neighbouring countries. Through the MIR
(or IPS
9) system, Bulgaria is synchronized with
the former CMEA countries, notably with the
Ukraine and Romania. With ex-Yugoslavia and
Greece, both a part of the Western European
UCPE
1
0 network, Bulgaria is linked on the ba-
sis of the so-called isolated island principle (i.e.
partial synchronization) because of the different
standards prevailing in the Eastern and Western
grids. Moreover, Bulgaria is connected with
Turkey, a country not participating in either the
IPS or the UCPE grids, but flexible enough, as
far as the technical standards are concerned, to
exchange power with countries belonging to
both grid systems.
Table 8 — The Length of Bulgaria's Electricity Lines by




































Source: Committee of Energy, unpublished statistics and
documents.
Similar to other segments of the energy mar-
ket, the transmission and distribution of elec-
tricity shows a series of operational problems
associated with poor service, a low level of in-
vestment and a lack of spare parts and new
equipment. In particular, the low- and middle-
voltage lines are not performing to their full ca-
pacity. Official data reveal transmission and
distribution losses of 10 to 12 per cent of total
electricity supply in the 1980s, a level that
matches quite well the average losses observed
in less developed countries. Furthermore, since
Bulgaria is a net importer of electricity, the un-
reliability of supplies from the Ukraine and the
problems affecting domestic electricity supply
call for a synchronization of Bulgaria's grid
with the one of Western Europe.
Bulgarian natural gas imports from the for-
mer Soviet Union enter the country through a
pipeline coming from Romania; it has a nomi-
nal capacity of 9 billion m
3/year and supplies16
mainly the petrochemical complex in Stara
Zagora. A second pipeline of similar capacity
crosses Bulgaria only to supply Soviet gas to
Greece and Turkey. An oil product pipeline
(carrying diesel) links the Burgas refinery with
the storage depots in Sofia. There is no infor-
mation on the distribution of heat.
4. Foreign Trade in Primary and
Final Energy
As a country poorly endowed with energy re-
sources, Bulgaria resorts to international trade
to satisfy an important share of its demand for
primary and final energy. According to the en-
ergy balance for 1991, total energy imports,
expressed in oil equivalent units, amounted to
more than one and a half times the level of
domestic production of primary energy (Table
A14). Some 37 per cent of the total domestic
input of coal was of foreign origin as well as
almost all crude oil, natural gas and oil prod-
ucts. Net imports of electricity reached 7 per
cent of total domestic electricity supply. Coal
imports mainly consisted of hard coal and coke.
Refined oil product imports referred particu-
larly to fuel oil.
In 1991, Bulgaria's imports of fuels,
minerals and metals accounted for the single
most important share of total import value from
all regions (about 59 per cent). On a regional
level, former CMEA member countries and
LDCs were the main sources of fuel imports.
Nearly 72 per cent of crude oil came from the
former Soviet Union, with LDCs (especially
Algeria, Lybia and Iran) providing the rest; im-
ports from Irak, formerly a relatively important
supplier, were interrupted because of the UN
embargo against Irak in the wake of the last
Gulf War. The former Soviet Union provided
natural gas (100 per cent), coal (80 per cent)
and oil products (38 per cent). Electricity was
mostly supplied by Russia and the Ukraine
through the CMEA grid MIR, with Greece,
Turkey and Albania providing only small quan-
tities each.
The slowdown in economic growth experi-
enced by Bulgaria after 1970, especially in the
1980s, along with the deterioration of this
country's foreign trade and payments position
had an impact on net energy imports. As can be
seen from Tables A5 to A6, A9 to A10 and
A14, imports (expressed in physical units) de-
creased substantially in the period 1985-1991.
Hard coal, coke, crude oil, refined oil products
and electricity imports fell by 50, 81, 68, 20
and 50 per cent, respectively. First, the foreign
supply of natural gas increased, reached its
maximum in 1990 and then fell by 17 per cent
in 1991. Imports of refined oil products, as mo-
tor and aviation petrol and fuel oil, contracted
by 32 and 48 per cent, respectively, between
1985 and 1991.
One of the fundamental factors affecting
Bulgaria's energy imports from the former
Soviet Union was the collapse of the traditional
CMEA clearing system, with trade valued in
transfer rubles (an accounting currency unit)
and the former Soviet Union switching to world
market prices and hard currency in January
1991, as far as energy exports were concerned.
In the old system, the Soviet Union charged a
five-year moving average of world prices ex-
pressed in transfer rubles, using an extremely
overvalued exchange rate vis-a-vis the US
dollar. As long as this moving average re-
mained below world market prices, CMEA
member countries as Bulgaria had the opportu-
nity of importing subsidized quantities of pri-
mary and final energy. This was the case for
crude oil until May 1983 and during the last
Gulf War; from May 1983 to July 1990 the
opposite was true [Foders, 1991]. Energy im-
ports were generally paid for with goods, as
agreed in the bilateral countertrade arrange-
ments. Since these goods were overpriced and
only rarely competitive in the markets of the
West, a further subsidy was implicit in this type
of exchange that, in the long run, rather reduced
the scope for a regional diversification of ex-
ports. For a long time, at least as long as
CMEA energy prices were set lower than world
market prices, terms of trade developed favour-
ably for the energy-importing member coun-17
tries of the CMEA. Some countries, notably
Bulgaria, were able to further improve their
terms of trade by using "cheap" crude oil im-
ports to produce refined products that could be
sold in the West for hard currency and at world
market prices.
Thus, the distortions characterizing the
CMEA region paradoxically resulted in both
integration effects (trade diversion and trade
creation in the energy field) and terms-of-trade
effects. These potential benefits, however, seem
to have been more than compensated by the
risks implied by the development of an uncom-
petitive industrial structure and the high de-
pendence on subsidized energy imports from
mainly one source. In recent years, the break-
down of the CMEA payments system and the
sharp decline of energy exports from the former
Soviet Union to Central and Eastern Europe,
resulting from serious disruptions of energy
production and transport and trade in the former
Soviet Union [Foders, 1991], fully revealed the
major weaknesses of intra-CMEA economic
relations.
5. Energy Consumption by Sources
and Economic Sectors
Bulgaria is a major energy consumer. Com-
pared to other Central and Eastern European
countries and measured by the per capita con-
sumption of energy, Bulgaria was fourth in the
ranking in 1965 (following Czechoslovakia,
Poland and Hungary [Table 9]). In 1990,
Czechoslovakia was the only Central and East-
em European country to use more energy than
Bulgaria. Interestingly, the low-middle-income
countries with a similar per capita income as
Bulgaria showed a much lower level of energy
consumption in 1990, although Algeria's con-
sumption grew much faster than Bulgaria's and
Malaysia's consumption expanded at the same
rate as Bulgaria's in the period 1965-1990. As
measured by energy intensity of GDP at current
exchange rates, Bulgaria is characterized by an
inefficient use of energy; as Romania's too,
Bulgaria's economy requires a comparatively
high input of total energy per unit of GDP
(Table 9).
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aEnergy consumption per unit of GDP at current exchange rates.
—
 b Annual average growth rates. —
 cUnweighted average; the
figure for the lower-middle-income countries includes Bulgaria.
Source: World Bank [b, 1992, 1993]; own calculations.
In contrast to the diversified structure of the
total input of primary and final energy into the
Bulgarian economy, in 1991 final energy con-
sumption was concentrated on oil products and
coal. Natural gas and coal accounted for about
12 per cent each, heat for 31 per cent, electric-
ity for 20 per cent and oil products for 25 per
cent. Taking into account that electricity and
heat are both largely generated by coal and oil
burning power plants, the contribution of coal
and oil to final energy consumption is a major
one.
Most energy is being used in the manufactur-
ing industry, where iron and steel (16.5 per cent
of industrial consumption) and chemicals (40
per cent) account for the highest shares. Indus-
try is followed by households (19 per cent of
total consumption); all other sectors (agricul-
ture, construction, transport, the public sector)
are rather small consumers.
Industry is the biggest user of natural gas (99
per cent), coal (56 per cent), electricity (47 per
cent) and oil products (45 per cent), whereas
industry and households together consume the
lion's share of the supplied heat (about 38 per
cent each). Households are also important as18
electricity users; they do not use natural gas.
The manufacturing of chemicals is the most en-
ergy-intensive activity, as far as oil products,
natural gas and electricity are concerned. The
production of iron and steel is very coal-inten-
sive. Food, beverages and tobacco also need a
quite high input level of energy, particularly of
oil products, electricity and heat. Finally, tex-
tiles, clothing and leather manufacturing require
more heat than any other industry.
The available data and information on the
demand side of the Bulgarian energy market do
not allow a deeper analysis either by sources or
by economic sectors. From the figures repre-
senting apparent consumption of primary and
final energy resources (Tables A5-A6 and A9-
A10), some conclusions may be drawn regard-
ing the evolution of this rough measure of con-
sumption in the period 1985-1992. In spite of
the continuing high level of energy consump-
tion in Bulgaria, apparent consumption of most
energy sources decreased during the second half
of the 1980s. While hard coal suffered a
contraction of about 50 per cent, crude oil and
refined oil products fell by 66 and 58 per cent,
respectively. The demand for electricity and
brown coal only showed a comparatively minor
decrease, whereas the consumption of natural
gas increased somewhat. The consumption of
oil products was also reduced. These develop-
ments seem to indicate quite well the close rela-
tionship between economic growth and energy
use. The slowdown in economic growth in the
1980s, as well as the recession experienced in
recent years, had a clear impact on the Bulgar-
ian energy consumption.
6. Environmental Aspects
Bulgaria's industrialization strategy resulted in
a heavy burden for the environment. Air, water
and land resources were sytematically under-
priced, and the exposure of these resources to
pollutants stemming mainly from heavy indus-
try and the energy sector resulted in high social
costs of economic activities under the old
regime. The overall environmental picture in-
cludes features such as the contamination of
drinking water sources, air pollution in urban
areas and in regions in which industrial or
mining complexes are located, and the use of
valuable agricultural land to dump waste. The
legacy of the past thus points at another topic
that should rank high on the agenda of eco-
nomic transformation: environmental policy.
Table 10 -
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Source: Committee of Energy, unpublished statistics and
documents; own estimates.
To what extent can the environmental condi-
tions in Bulgaria be attributed to the energy
sector? Table 10 shows the main sources of
sulphur dioxide emissions related to energy
use. Thermal power plants turn out to constitute
the single most important source, particularly
those plants that burn domestic (high sulphur,
low caloric value) lignite. The use of high-sul-
phur brown coal briquettes in households, gen-
erally for heating, makes them the second
source of SO2 pollution, especially in residen-
tial zones. The intensive utilization of coal is
also associated with emissions of carbon diox-
ide (CO2), which are excessively high in Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries because of
the dominant role of coal in their energy mix
(Table 11). As far as Bulgaria is concerned,
there are two main sources of CO2 pollution,
coal and oil, which is why Bulgaria comes very
close to the average fuel shares in world CO219
emissions. Eastern Europe accounted for about
6 per cent of global CO2 emissions in 1990 and
is expected to slightly reduce its share to
around 5 per cent in 2050, according to simula-
tions with the OECD's GREEN model for a
scenario with no substantial changes in national
environmental policies around the globe (Table
12).

































Source: Bumiaux et al. [1992a, Table 4].
Table 12 — CO2 Emissions in Selected Regions, 1990-









































as-usual scenario. — Central and Eastern European countries.
Source: Oliveira-Martins et al. [1992, Table 4].
Besides the energy mix, the level of energy
consumption is another major reason for the
important contribution of the energy sector to
environmental pollution. Estimates for the in-
come elasticity of energy demand in Eastern
Europe are somewhat higher than those for the
EC member countries and the United States
(Table 13). They are on a par with the average
elasticity for the world; energy demand in rap-
idly growing developing countries (Brazil,
China, India and other NICs from Southeast
Asia) exceeds the level observed in Eastern
Europe. As in many NICs, the relatively high
income elasticity of energy demand in Eastern
Europe reflects to a great extend energy price
distortions (mainly subsidies) and their effect
on the choice of production technologies at the
firm level. Interestingly, in the case of Eastern
Europe the CO2 elasticity matches the energy
elasticity, whereas in the EC and the United
States the CO2 elasticity turns out to be lower,
and in the former Soviet Union (as well as in
LDCs) it turns out to be higher than the energy
elasticity (Table 13). This seems to underline
the close relationship between CO2 emissions
and energy use in Central and Eastern Europe.






































Simulation results. — Annual average growth rates; business-
as-usual scenario. —
 cAnnual average growth rate of real GDP
divided by the annual average growth rate of CO2 emissions. —
dExtended Linear Expenditure System (ELES) estimates. —
eCentral and Eastern European countries.
Source: Bumiaux et al. [1992a, Tables 3, 5; 1992b, Table
15]; own calculations.
One of the major SO2 pollutants in Bulgaria
is the large Maritza-East power complex (about
700,000 tonnes of SO2 per year). Although this
complex is endowed with high stacks for dis-
persion and electrostatic precipitators to reduce
the environmental consequences of sulphur
emissions, the sulphur concentration of this
plant's emissions remains high. Also, mining in
this area (the power plant is linked to a coal
mine) has adversely affected thousands of hec-
tares of agricultural land. Another important
Bulgarian polluter is the refinery located at
Burgas; it discharges big amounts of largely
unfiltered wastewater into the Black Sea. Since
environmental regulation including some of the
severest standards in Eastern Europe tradi-
tionally existed in Bulgaria, the environmental
conditions are rather a result of the poor en-
forcement of such standards.20
7. Strengths and Weaknesses
The supply side of the Bulgarian energy market
is characterized by the following strengths:
— Bulgaria uses a diversified basket of pri-
mary and final energy resources.
— The nominal installed capacity to gener-
ate electricity and to refine crude oil ex-
ceeds domestic demand.
— The geological potential for discovering
onshore and especially offshore hydro-
carbons is promising.
— Bulgaria is linked to international elec-
tricity and natural gas grids.
Its weaknesses are as follows:
— Bulgaria is only poorly endowed with
primary energy resources and thus highly
dependent on imports of primary energy.
— Energy imports come mainly from Rus-
sia, which is itself experiencing major
supply disruptions.
— The available effective capacity to gen-
erate electricity falls short of peak de-
mand, because power plant and distribu-
tion equipment is seriously deterioted.
— The only Bulgarian nuclear plant does
not comply with Western safety stan-
dards.
— Primary energy production and transport
have a strong effect on the environment.
The demand side of the Bulgarian energy mar-
ket is characterized by the following strengths:
— a large scope for improving energy effi-
ciency and energy conservation in gen-
eral;
— a large potential for energy savings
looming in the transformation of the
Bulgarian economy, particularly by re-
ducing both the weight of energy-inten-
sive industries in the future composition
of the manufacturing sector and energy
use in all sectors of the economy.
Its weaknesses are as follows:
— a low level of energy efficiency in all
sectors of the economy;
— a high share of oil products and lignite in
energy consumption;
— a heavy environmental impact of oil and
coal use in terms of emissions of SO2
and CO2;
— the absence of taxes on energy consump-
tion and environmental pollution, and the
poor enforcement of environmental stan-
dards.
IV. Energy Policy
Energy policy has traditionally played a key
role in Bulgarian economic policy. This is
clearly reflected in the fact that Bulgaria opted
for the former CMEA's energy-intensive indus-
trialization strategy, in spite of being poorly
endowed, with energy resources. The wide-
spread distortion of factor and product prices in
the CMEA system blurred true factor endow-
ments and comparative advantage. National en-
ergy policy was thus expected to close the
widening gap between energy demand arising
from energy-intensive industrialization on the
one hand and energy supply on the other hand.
Energy supply consisted mainly of fuels im-
ported from the former Soviet Union; imports
from non-CMEA countries were severely re-
stricted by Bulgaria's limited access to foreign
exchange. In an attempt to hedge against the
risk of supply disruptions, Bulgaria drew heav-
ily on locally available, low-quality lignite and
increasingly turned to the nuclear option, hop-
ing to have found the shortest road to autarky in
the energy field.21
1. Organization of the Energy Sector
Although Bulgaria spent most of the postwar
years practicing central planning, surprisingly
energy policy and its institutions were decen-
tralized. The energy sector consisted and still
consists of a series of companies and institu-
tions reporting to different "committees" and
ministries. As shown in Figure 1, the Commit-
tee of Energy, the Committee of Geology and
Mineral Resources and the Ministry of Industry
are in control of most of the government-owned
companies operating in this sector. In the past,
the Ministry of Foreign Relations was in charge
of the only Bulgarian energy trading company.
Formally, the Council of Ministers takes in-
vestment decisions and is responsible for en-
ergy pricing. In practice, the Council of Minis-
ters sets prices at all levels and determines the
budget allocations for the energy companies.
Details that relate to the use of funds in indi-
vidual companies are generally dealt with at the
committee or ministry level. Interestingly, such
executive decisions are taken with no reference
at all to a consistent energy programme with
own policy objectives, but rather following
objectives derived from national priorities con-
cerning industrial development.
The inherited organizational structure of the
energy sector is very likely to change in the
event of total or partial privatization of energy
companies. For the time being, however, en-
ergy companies will not be prepared for pri-
vatization. The only measure taken to
strengthen these companies in the phase of eco-
nomic transition was to create the legal back-
ground for transforming them into joint stock
or limited liability companies. Also, plans for
fostering the participation of private (mostly
foreign) firms in some subsectors are not yet
based on a comprehensive legal-institutional
framework. For example, in the upstream seg-
ment of the oil and gas industry, in which the











































government is currently preparing the second
round of licensing in the Bulgarian zone of the
Black Sea continental shelf, both a consistent
policy and the necessary legal and administra-
tive infrastructure are still absent. In negotiating
offshore licences with Western consortia, the
government is under pressure to proceed with
the pertinent rules neither publicly known nor
entirely fixed. Oil and gas projects being of a
long-term nature, the participating foreign com-
panies are expected to bear the risk of future
changes in oil law, a fact that does not con-
tribute to increase the (rather low) propensity of
investing in the Bulgarian energy sector.
2. National Priorities for the Energy
Sector
Until 1989, there were three official priorities
for the energy sector: (i) to maximize the use of
domestic energy resources, (ii) to rapidly ex-
pand the use of nuclear energy and (iii) to
stimulate energy saving. The first priority was
to encourage the utilization of low-quality lig-
nite in thermal plants and households. Whereas
the substitution of domestic coal for energy im-
ports made sense as a short-run reaction to a
transitory foreign exchange constraint, the sec-
ond priority actually deepened Bulgaria's de-
pendency on imports. This resulted from the
fact that Bulgaria had to import almost every
input into nuclear plants and, in addition, facili-
ties to handle nuclear waste lacked; as men-
tioned above, Bulgarian uranium ore is of low
quality. The third official priority, energy sav-
ing, was never implemented. There was no allo-
cation at all of investment for energy-saving
purposes, and the government never created
material incentives to save energy. The same
applies to the protection of the environment
from the discharges of polluting substances
associated with energy production, distribution
and consumption.
A non-official but in practice extremely rele-
vant priority concerned the improvement of
foreign exchange earnings by re-exporting en-
ergy. The re-export generally affected refinery
products derived from cracking crude oil from
Soviet sources. Oil products were exported to
Western countries at world market prices. An-
other important non-official priority concerned
energy prices. The government was committed
to maintain relatively low prices for all users.
The national policy of subsidizing energy con-
sumption implied setting prices that were much
lower than the domestic costs of production,
importation and distribution of energy. The fi-
nancial gap resulting from such a policy forced
the electricity companies to operate perma-
nently with deficits. At first, these deficits were
entirely financed resorting to funds from the
federal budget; later, they were increasingly fi-
nanced with bank loans, which resulted in an
important accumulation of internal debt by the
sector (1991/92: about leva 3.5 billion direct
state credits and leva 3 billion bank loans). The
structure of prices typical for Bulgarian energy
policy is heavily distorted in favour of house-
holds (Table All). Whereas in Western coun-
tries households generally pay higher prices
than industry, because it is cheaper to supply
energy to major consumers than to households,
in Bulgaria the opposite was and is still true.
Although after the Big Bang in February
1991 energy prices remained regulated, they
were allowed to increase then and several times
thereafter. This notwithstanding, energy prices
increased at a much slower pace than the con-
sumer price index, which is tantamount to say
that they actually fell in real terms. Since the
leva was not devalued according to the differ-
ence between the domestic and the foreign in-
flation rate, it has been overvalued for some
time. Thus, the wedge between Bulgarian and
world market prices for energy increased al-
most pari passu with domestic inflation (run-
ning at 80 per cent per year at the end of 1992).
In the area of nuclear power, Bulgaria began
to receive foreign help to cope with problems
associated with plant safety and the operation
of the existing reactors.23
3. Strengths and Weaknesses
The Bulgarian energy sector with its institu-
tional and policy features has the following
strengths:
— The sector is highly decentralized.
— Energy companies are being transformed
into joint stock or limited liability com-
panies.
— Nuclear safety problems have been iden-
tified and are being taken care of with
foreign help.
Its weaknesses are as follows:
— Responsibility for energy policy is
widely scattered and not clearly defined.
— There is no coherent energy policy.
— Energy consumption is still subsidized;
prices are regulated.
The structure of consumer prices favours
households and discriminates against in-
dustry and other major consumers.
The subsidization of energy consumption
has several consequences: (i) high do-
mestic energy demand, (ii) inefficient use
of energy, (iii) continuation of the soft
budget constraint for energy companies
and accumulation of debt and (iv) ad-
verse environmental effect.
There is no comprehensive legal-institu-
tional framework for the production, dis-
tribution and consumption of energy.
There is no privatization plan for the en-
ergy sector.
There is no policy for the participation of
foreign companies in the energy sector
(exception: offshore oil and gas).
There is no explicit link between energy
and environmental policy.
V. Energy Policy Outlook: Possible Scenarios
Almost every economic activity in Bulgaria is
of the energy-intensive type. As far as the
ongoing process of transformation influences
some of the conditions that in the past sup-
ported the choice of energy-using technologies,
the energy sector will be forced to undergo
substantial structural changes, in order to adjust
to the new fundamentals prevailing on both the
micro- and macroeconomic levels. The close
relationship that exists between transition and
energy policy implies that an exploration of
possible scenarios, each of these representing
alternative combinations of transition and en-
ergy policies, contributes to the discussion of
policy options for Bulgaria. Drawing upon the
economic analysis of the Bulgarian energy
market and the public policy in Sections II to
IV, I shall now turn to assess several hypotheti-
cal scenarios with the intention to shed some
light on the probable development of the energy
sector in Bulgaria in the 1990s.
The first scenario (Scenario A) to be ad-
dressed here is the base case in which virtually
no change takes place compared to the situation
observed in 1992; it is being assumed that the
current policies will be continued until the end
of the decade. This scenario involves a long
period of recession-cum-inflation, with the cor-
responding high social costs in terms of unem-
ployment, real income losses and capital flight.
Under these circumstances, the transformation
process could slow down, thereby adversely af-
fecting the recent privatization initiative as well
as the overall level of involving (local and for-
eign) private firms in the economy. Economic
stability will not be achieved, and Bulgarian
economic policies will quickly loose credibility
both in the country and abroad. Foreign debt
will remain a problem. With neither a liberali-
zation of energy prices nor foreign direct in-
vestment in the energy sector in sight, the crisis
in the Bulgarian energy sector is likely to
deepen, even if energy demand were to fall
significantly in the wake of the recession. The
country, traditionally dependent on primary en-
ergy imports (crude oil, hard coal, natural gas24
and enriched uranium) and the production of
indigenous lignite, will be forced to continue
and possibly further deepen its dependency on
lignite and nuclear power; the general macro-
economic situation and especially the foreign
exchange constraint will reduce the already
narrow scope for imports. To maintain oil im-
ports at past levels will mean to further increase
foreign debt. It is difficult to predict whether
the nuclear power plant at Kozloduy will be
able to operate at an acceptable level of capac-
ity for the next decade without substantial new
investment. The risk of a major accident looms
large today; in the base case scenario, no sig-
nificant improvement in the plant's safety is
planned during the 1990s. The status of the en-
vironment will predictably deteriorate in a set-
ting in which the traditional reliance on high-
sulphur lignite is bound to increase, while in-
vestment in desulphurization and similar facili-
ties are neglected.
The role of energy policy in the base case
does not differ much from the role energy pol-
icy had during the reign of central planning: it
has the responsibility to make ends meet, that is
to make demand and supply match, a task vir-
tually impossible to be achieved as long as eco-
nomic policy tolerates fundamental macroeco-
nomic disequilibria. In such a scenario, energy
policy could turn out to be irrelevant.
The second scenario (Scenario B) assumes
that stabilization succeeds and the recession is
overcome. According to the forecasts for the
Bulgarian economy presented in Table 7, a
low- and a high-growth scenario seem plausi-
ble. In the low-growth scenario, the economy of
Bulgaria grows at a lower rate than in the high-
growth scenario. The salient features of both
growth paths, which differ in the length of the
time period needed to recover from recession
and to reach positive rates of real GDP growth,
include price stability, higher employment,
higher investment (of domestic and particularly
of foreign origin), a rather undervalued ex-
change rate, a satisfactory international settle-
ment for the foreign debt problem, export
growth, etc. On the energy side, energy demand
picks up part passu with economic activity.
Some segments of the energy market are pri-
vatized and capital and technology inflows help
to improve the sector's efficiency, safety and
environmental standards.
Under the conditions prevailing in Scenario
B, energy policy becomes relevant. Price lib-
eralization would be the measure most urgentiy
needed; the domestic structure of energy prices
should reflect international prices (all other in-
puts being valued at costs or international
prices). This will make a valuation of Bulgarian
products and services at international prices vi-
able. Once the former (artificial) comparative
advantage in energy-intensive goods and serv-
ices has disappeared, Bulgaria's economy will
be forced to lower the energy intensity of pro-
duction to increase its competitiveness in the
world market. A lower energy intensity would
lead to a lower domestic demand for energy. A
new structure of fuel prices and a lower overall
demand for energy will call for structural
change in the Bulgarian energy sector.
What are the options for the Bulgarian en-
ergy policy in a growth scenario? Options
should comply with at least two criteria: (i) the
compatibility with the current structure of en-
ergy prices in Europe (in particular in the EC
member countries) and (ii) the compatibility
with Bulgaria's resource endowment. Consider-
ing these restrictions, one option for Bulgaria
could consist in increasing the share of natural
gas in the national fuel mix (Option El). Natu-
ral gas could be imported from Russia through
an already existing pipeline; new pipelines
would have to be built to distribute the gas
within the country. Investment in thermal
power plants would make the shift from lignite
to natural gas viable. The remaining fuels
(lignite, oil, hydro and nuclear power) would
contribute to a diversification of Bulgaria's en-
ergy sources. Another option would be to con-
tinue and further strengthen the reliance on im-
ported oil (Option E2). A third option could be
to maximize the share of nuclear energy in the
national fuel mix (Option E3). Finally, a fourth
option would be to concentrate on conservation
as the main source of energy, letting prices and
costs determine the optimal fuel mix for Bui-25
garia (Option E4). While in Options El to E3
taxes and price liberalization should be used as
policy instruments to achieve the respective
aims, Option E4 relies entirely on price liber-
alization (see Table 14 for an overview).


















Taxes and price Price liberali-
liberalization zation
aBusiness-as-usual scenario (slow transition). — Accelerated
transition.
The use of natural gas (Option El) would
fulfil the price criterion, in view of the fact that
world reserves of natural gas by far exceed oil
reserves. Moreover, about 40 per cent of total
gas reserves are located in the former Soviet
Union, mainly in the Russian Federation, which
means that transport costs do not have a major
effect on the supply costs of gas for Bulgaria.
This option also satisfies the resource availabil-
ity criterion at least in part. Another 40 per cent
of world reserves can be found in the OPEC
member countries. In case Russian supplies
should become permanently unreliable, a pipe-
line to one of the nearest OPEC countries could
be built. However, apart from minor distur-
bances, Russian supplies to Western Europe
(for example, to Germany) have not yet proved
to be generally unreliable. Furthermore, from
the point of view of environmental protection,
natural gas is much "cleaner" than hard coal,
lignite and oil. Natural gas could substitute for
lignite in most power plants and, in addition,
serve residential purposes (e.g. heating and
cooking).
An increase in the share of oil in Bulgaria's
fuel mix (Option E2) would have several
adverse effects. First, the world reserves of
crude oil are concentrated in the OPEC coun-
tries (78 per cent). This fact increases the prob-
ability for an increase in the real price of oil in
the long run. Thus, Bulgaria, as a net oil im-
porter, could become vulnerable to an uncon-
trollable oil bill. Second, as many Western
countries have found out, the environmental ef-
fect of using oil intensively is considerably
higher than the environmental effect of using
natural gas intensively, particularly as far as
CO2 is concerned, even if it is still somewhat
lower than the effect of lignite or hard coal.
Thus, although today oil is one of the relatively
cheap fuels, a greater reliance on oil creates the
risk of future oil price increases, even if the
transport costs of oil (from Russia or some
OPEC member country) to Bulgaria would be
negligible.
A full reliance on nuclear energy (Option E3)
assumes that every stage of the nuclear process
can be operated profitably in Bulgaria. As a
country endowed with very low grade uranium,
Bulgaria will have to import enriched uranium.
Furthermore, Bulgaria will remain an importer
of nuclear technology, equipment, spare parts
and repair services. Also, the recycling and/or
dumping of nuclear waste cannot as yet be done
in the country; the corresponding services will
also have to be imported. Moreover, it is ques-
tionable whether the existing plant at Kozloduy
will remain in operation for any longer period
of time. Technically, it will be difficult (and
expensive) to achieve Western safety standards
in the old Soviet-type reactors. Therefore, as
elementary analysis shows, nuclear power does
not appear to constitute either a profitable
choice or an opportunity for Bulgaria to in-
crease its independence from foreign energy
supplies.
Finally, the conservation option (E4) implies
that the liberalization of energy prices at all
levels will lead to a lower overall energy in-
tensity in the Bulgarian economy and thus to a
lower level of energy demand. Higher energy
prices would create incentives for a substitution
of energy for capital and labour, and for energy
saving. With an efficient use of energy re-
sources in an economic setting in which pro-
duction factors as well as products and services
are valued at international prices, the lower
level of energy demand will relieve the country
from the pressure to import hydrocarbons and26
to maximize the use of high-sulphur lignite and
high-risk Soviet nuclear technologies. In the
long run, this option will pave the way for the
country to arrive at an optimal fuel mix, subject
to the international prices of fuels and capital.
Whichever option the Bulgarian government
selects, two additional aspects should be given
a leading role in the process of designing an
appropriate energy strategy: (i) the environ-
mental effect of energy production, distribution
and consumption, and (ii) the opportunities de-
rived from the European Energy Charter, par-
ticularly in view of the recent association of
Bulgaria to the EC. Environmental issues cur-
rently rank high on the policy agenda of OECD
countries. One of the most important topics
discussed by these countries is the global re-
duction of greenhouse gases, particularly of
CO2. The alternative policy instruments pro-
posed to reduce global CO2 emissions include
the introduction of a CO2 tax in the OECD
member countries, the introduction of an en-
ergy-cum-CO2 tax only in the EC member
countries and the implementation of a Toronto-
type agreement with the participation of several
countries (including developing, Eastern Euro-
pean and NIS countries).
As can be inferred from Table A12, global
CO2 emissions can be best reduced through a
collective move of the kind implied by the
Toronto agreement. The reason for this is that,
because of the drastic reduction of energy con-
sumption and the generally low growth rates
observed in the OECD member countries,
emissions are increasingly concentrated in the
developing countries and in Eastern Europe and
the NIS. Thus, the global effect of unilateral
OECD or EC moves is likely to be only mar-
ginal. Since the energy sector is a major con-
tributor of CO2 emissions, this underlines the
global importance of designing energy strate-
gies in Eastern Europe that explicitly take into
account environmental aspects. At the same
time, national policies Oiberalization of prices)
could significantly reinforce the total effect of
concerted action on an international level
(Table A12). According to simulations carried
out with the OECD's GREEN model, the costs
of reducing CO2 emissions (in terms of real in-
come losses) will be negligible, also for Eastern
European countries (Table A13).
Therefore, environmental policy in Bulgaria
should be closely linked to energy policy,
which means that it should focus on energy-
related pollution. The state of the art in envi-
ronmental economics [Cropper, Oates, 1992]
suggests that Pigouvian taxes could be the ap-
propriate (albeit second-best) policy instrument
for pollution control in Bulgaria, even if mar-
ketable-permits-cum-legal-liability were to be a
first-best option for an OECD member country.
The reason is that two criteria concerning the
viability of policy instruments under the gen-
eral conditions prevailing in Eastern Europe
point towards a tax solution: simplicity and the
level of enforcement costs. Certain taxes are
easy to administer (compared to marketable
permits and legal liability) and cheaper to en-
force than marketable permits, emission stan-
dards and legal liability. For an environmental
tax to be effective, however, it should be
designed keeping the "polluter pays principle"
in mind on the one hand, and, on the other
hand, lists of inputs (fuels) or outputs (goods
and services) embodying or otherwise related to
the respective pollutant should be focused upon
(CO2, SO2). An alternative approach would be
to concentrate the tax burden on energy con-
sumption (for example, on a BTU basis).
The European Energy Charter, signed by
countries located in the geographical "Europe"
(Eastern and Western Europe, including the
former Soviet Union) and the G-24, has three
main objectives: the expansion of trade in en-
ergy, cooperation and coordination in the en-
ergy field and an optimum use of energy and
environmental resources. These objectives en-
tail a removal of trade barriers for energy and
associated equipment, the transfer of Western
technology, the promotion of energy sources
with a relatively low environmental effect and
the development of new and renewable fuels.
The benefits Bulgaria could reap from a partici-
pation in the actions envisaged by the European
Energy Charter would encompass the acceler-
ated access to the Western European electricity27
grid and to energy know-how and modern
"clean" technologies. Specific agreements ne-
gotiated within the framework of the Charter
could offer Bulgaria the additional opportunity
to closely cooperate with the West in improv-
ing the safety of the nuclear plant at Kozloduy
and in modernizing other power stations and
the transmission of power and heat within the
country.
VI. Summary and Policy Conclusions
1. Summary of Findings
Bulgaria is scarcely endowed with energy re-
sources (mainly low-quality lignite) and tradi-
tionally resorts to international trade to satisfy a
major share of its demand for primary energy.
As a member country of the former CMEA,
Bulgaria pursued an energy-intensive strategy
of industrialization in the period 1946-1989;
during this period, it became highly dependent
on fuel imports from mainly one source, the
former Soviet Union. The rapidly increasing
domestic energy demand led to a mounting gap
between energy supply and demand. Regional
developments after 1989 contributed to a fur-
ther deepening of the Bulgarian energy crisis:
the collapse of the CMEA and the rearrange-
ment of the international economic relations of
the former Soviet Union disrupted Bulgarian
imports, thereby creating serious shortages of
fuels.
Although Bulgaria makes use of a rather di-
versified basket of primary energy, operational
problems affecting the domestic conversion of
primary into final energy impose an important
restriction on the level of energy supply. This
bottleneck derives from the actual degree of ca-
pacity utilization in the electric power genera-
tion sector. Nominal installed capacity exceeds
domestic electricity demand by far. However,
power plants are generally unable to maintain
high utilization rates and to meet peak demand
because of both the use of deficient and obso-
lete equipment and the fuel supply shocks men-
tioned above.
In contrast to primary energy supply, the
structure of final energy demand is heavily bi-
ased towards only two fuels, oil products and
coal, particularly lignite. Major consumers of
final energy are the chemical industry, the iron
and steel industry, and households. The ex-
tremely low level of energy efficiency, the
completely outdated equipment and the particu-
lar mix of domestic energy production and con-
sumption observed in Bulgaria all have an ad-
verse impact on the environment as measured
by SO2 and CO2 emissions.
The current energy crisis in Bulgaria is the
consequence of an energy policy that, over a
period of several decades, favoured cheap en-
ergy and totally neglected investment in safety
and environmental protection. Distorted energy
prices encouraged energy use and led to the
emergence of an economy governed by energy-
intensive technologies. The transformation of
the Bulgarian economy, initiated in 1989 and
progressing only very slowly, has not yet
brought about structural change in the energy
sector. Not even the recession-cum-inflation
experienced in 1991 and 1992 gave the country
some relief from the energy crisis. Many of the
distortions prevailing under central planning are
still in place and new ones have appeared.
Since prices for imported primary energy are on
a par with international prices, since domestic
prices of other inputs were liberalized in 1991
and since consumer prices for energy products
are still lower than production costs, power
plants and refineries have been accumulating
substantial internal debt and thus have increas-
ingly turned into a burden for the already defi-
cit-ridden government budget. Furthermore, the
existing pattern of consumer prices for energy
continues to benefit households and to dis-
criminate against industry, in spite of the fact
that the marginal costs of providing energy in-28
curred by the utilities is lower for industry than
for households.
For systemic reasons, one would expect to
find a highly centralized organization of the en-
ergy sector in Bulgaria. The opposite is true:
Bulgarian public institutions and companies in-
volved in the sector are rather decentralized.
There is neither an energy ministry nor a divi-
sion or department in any other ministry with
the power to design, implement and monitor a
national energy policy. Responsibility is widely
scattered among several committees and other
institutions, each of which enjoys a vague de-
limitation of their respective duties. Not sur-
prisingly, a coherent energy policy is not yet in
sight. Neither are detailed plans for a privatiza-
tion of Bulgarian energy companies nor the
participation of foreign companies in this sec-
tor. The same applies to a legal-institutional
framework including laws governing produc-
tion, transport and consumption of energy in a
market economy.
2. Policy Conclusions
The following conclusions can be drawn from
the economic analysis of the Bulgarian energy
sector: First, energy reform cannot be separated
from the overall transformation process. Energy
reform is, in fact, a central part of it. To be ef-
fective, market-oriented energy policies pre-
suppose the existence of an economic setting
free of major micro- and macroeconomic dis-
equilibria. As long as the most companies in
the energy sector are government-owned, how-
ever, reliance on government involvement to
achieve energy policy goals will remain crucial.
Second, energy reform in an import-dependent
transitional country will not be successful as
long as trade barriers continue to affect energy
demand and supply. In the case of such trade
barriers, the wedge between international and
Bulgarian prices for domestically produced pri-
mary energy (for example, lignite) remains
unchallenged. Third, energy reform will not be
feasible as long as a coherent energy policy and
specific guidelines for the timing and sequenc-
ing of policy measures are absent. Furthermore,
without restructuring the responsibility for
energy and concentrating it in one ministry or
agency to minimize present inefficiencies, the
design of a coherent policy is virtually impossi-
ble. Fourth, there is a close link between en-
ergy production, transport and consumption on
the one hand and environmental pollution on
the other hand. This linkage should be taken
into account in the design of a coherent policy.
Fifth, the lack of a comprehensive legal-institu-
tional framework for the energy sector is an ob-
stacle to the efficient implementation and moni-
toring of a coherent energy policy. Sixth, with-
out both the privatization of Bulgarian energy
companies and a strong participation of foreign
firms in the Bulgarian energy sector, Bulgaria
is not very likely to have access to the capital
and technology required to modernize the
sector.
Energy policy should comprise (i) price lib-
eralization to increase energy efficiency, (ii)
taxation to reduce energy-related environmental
pollution, (iii) a regional diversification of im-
ports of primary and final energy and (iv) meas-
ures to attract investment and new technologies
to the sector.
(i) Energy policy should concentrate on the
liberalization of domestic prices for primary
and final energy. For an efficient allocation of
primary fuels produced domestically, the lat-
ter's prices should be on a par with import
prices at the Bulgarian border for comparable
fuel quality. The favourable geographical loca-
tion of Bulgaria with respect to energy export-
ing countries reduces the importance of trans-
port costs. Prices for final energy should reflect
production costs and, at the same time, a rate of
return on the capital invested in the production
of energy products (e.g. not lower than the
average rate achieved in the manufacturing
industry). Once prices for primary and final
energy indicate the true scarcity of these inputs
and products, a fuel mix will emerge on both
sides of the market that will contribute to an
efficient use of energy and other resources.
(ii) The divergence of social and private
costs associated with the environmental effect29
of energy production, transport and consump-
tion can be dealt with by taxing consumption. It
should be noted, however, that such a tax (e.g.
a uniform ad valorem percentage of the gross
retail price of energy products including sales
or value added tax) works indirectly and does
not directly affect the polluter, thus, it does not
offer incentives for the polluter to introduce
abatement devices as, for example, desulphuri-
zation equipment. Emission fees, in contrast, do
create such incentives but are not recommended
here, because they are of a complex nature and
assume a level of sophistication of the enforc-
ing authorities that is generally not being met in
Bulgaria. Moreover, the enforcement costs of
emission charges are likely to be higher than
the enforcement costs of a simple uniform tax
at the retail level. Nevertheless, consumption-
oriented environmental taxes could be selec-
tively complemented with emission standards,
applicable at least to the few major polluters
(thermal plants, refineries, chemical complexes,
etc.), which should be relatively easy and cheap
to control. If standards are not met, polluters
should be fined.
(iii) Concerning the integration of Bulgaria
into the world energy market, the trade compo-
nent of energy policy should follow a principle
of prudent financial management: "Never put
all your eggs in one basket". A diversification
of risk can be readily achieved by using a bal-
anced array of fuels (including nuclear power)
each of which are imported from several
sources. Diversification of fuels and suppliers is
the best hedge against potential supply disrup-
tions.
(iv) In view of the association of Bulgaria to
the EC, close cooperation between Bulgaria and
the EC member countries could contribute to
accelerate the reform of the Bulgarian energy
sector. The association agreement mentions en-
ergy as an area for economic cooperation in
several articles of Title VI (72, 73, 79, 80 and
81). Whereas Article 73 refers to the coal in-
dustry, 80 to nuclear safety and 81 to environ-
mental protection, Article 79 describes the
areas to be served by technical assistance from
the EC. This cooperation, which is to take place
within the framework of the European Energy
Charter, will cover, among other things, the
formulation and planning of energy policy, the
development of (new) energy resources, the
promotion of energy saving and energy effi-
ciency, the modernization of infrastructure, the
improvement of natural gas and electricity
transmission, and, most importantly, the open-
ing of the EC energy market for natural gas and
electricity for Bulgaria. As a result of opening
this market, Bulgaria could, for example, in-
crease its electricity imports and substitute
them for electricity produced by burning low-
grade, high-ash and high-sulphur domestic
lignite. Moreover, cooperation with EC mem-
ber countries could foster technology transfer
and the participation of private foreign firms in
the restructuring of the Bulgarian energy sector.
As far as the timing and sequencing of policy
instruments are concerned, Bulgaria should al-
ready in the short run begin to design, imple-
ment and monitor a new energy policy (as the
one outlined above) and to concentrate the po-
litical responsibility for public policies affect-
ing the energy sector. In the medium run, Bul-
garia's energy market will benefit from an
acceleration of the transformation process and
the introduction of a comprehensive legal-insti-
tutional framework for the efficient operation of
privatized Bulgarian companies and the partici-
pation of foreign companies in the moderniza-
tion of the Bulgarian energy sector.30
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Source: World Bank [c].











































































































































Source: PlanEcon [c, August 1992, June 1993]; own calculations.31































































































































































Source: PlanEcon [c, August 1992]; own calculations.32































































— The average for the lower-middle-income





















































Source: World Bank [b, 1992, Table 24, 1993, Table 24]; own calculations.





































































































































Source: Committee of Energy, unpublished statistics and documents; PlanEcon [b, 1992,1993]; own estimates.33

























































































Source: See Table A5.




































































































Source: Committee of Energy, unpublished statistics and documents.34















































































Source: Committee of Energy, unpublished statistics and documents.
Table A9 — Bulgaria's Production,
















































Source: Committee of Energy, unpublished statistics and documents; PlanEcon [b, 1992, 1993]; own estimates.35














































































































































Source: See Table A9.36




























































Source: Committee of Energy, unpublished statistics and documents.










CO2 emissions in 2050
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Source: Bumiaux et al. [1992a, Tables 2-9].
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Source: See Table A12.37
Table A14 — Energy Balance for Bulgaria, 1991 (tonnes of oil equivalent)
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Table A14 — continued
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Table A14 — continued
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Source: Committee of Energy, unpublished statistics and documents.40
Notes
1 The figure of 8.99 million reflects the position before the mass emigration (of ethnic Turks and other
citizens) since the fall of communism.
2 Cotton products, carpets, overcoats, men's suits, women's dresses, leather shoes and medicines.
3 Issues discussed in London include (i) a partial write-off of debt, (ii) permission for Bulgaria to buy back
its debt in the secondary market and (iii) a debt-equity swap programme [PlanEcon, a, 1992].
4 The official discount rate, which was at 4.5 per cent p. a. in 1990, was raised to 54 per cent in March 1991,
but lowered to 41 per cent p. a. one year later [OECD, CCEET, 1993].
5 The OECD estimates a budget deficit of 12.7 and 14.8 per cent of the GDP for 1990 and 1991, respectively
[OECD, CCEET, 1992, p. 16].
6 A firm complies with Bulgarian privatization rules if it has a complete ownership documentation and a
relatively "good" financial situation (i.e. fixed assets exceed liabilities). Firms that have to undergo restruc-
turing belong to the second class, whereas firms that are to be liquidated make up the third class [PlanEcon,
a, 1993, p. 8].
7 Expressed in simple terms, the hypothesis maintains that, under certain circumstances, poorer countries can
catch up faster with the leading (richest) country than countries almost as rich as the richest one; it has
been attributed to Baumol [1986].
8 If no other source is explicitly given, data mentioned in this chapter has been provided by the Bulgarian
Committee of Energy.
9 Interconnected Power Systems.
1
0 Union for the Coordination of Production and Transport of Electricity. This is the world's most important
grid (384 GW).41
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